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The uneasy coexistence of the Spanish foral  
and common regional finance systems
Antoni Zabalza *, Julio López-Laborda **
AbstrAct: This paper develops a model which integrates the foral or cupo sys-
tem applied to the Basque Country and Navarre, the common system applied to 
the other fifteen Spanish autonomous communities and the central government 
budget. The model shows that the theoretical cupo it generates is nothing more 
than an indirect form of measuring the equalising transfer between the central gov-
ernment and the corresponding autonomous jurisdiction. The cupo form per se is 
completely neutral: the foral jurisdictions operate exactly under the same financial 
conditions as the non-foral jurisdictions, despite that in the latter case the transfer 
is directly measured as the difference between expenditure needs and fiscal capac-
ity. In the context of our model, the cause of the foral economic advantage is the 
particular imputation procedure developed by the cupo law, which clearly biases 
the scales in favour of the foral and, therefore, against the non-foral communities. 
An economic advantage of the foral respect to the aggregate of the non-foral com-
munities that, even if only referred to the design of the cupo, we have estimated 
at 29.8% in the case of the Basque Country and at 28.2% in the case on Navarre. 
These calculations should be interpreted as a lower bound on the foral advantage. 
The model has clear implications for reform.
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La difícil coexistencia de los sistemas foral y común de financiación 
autonómica
rEsumEn: El trabajo desarrolla un modelo que integra los sistemas común y 
foral de financiación autonómica y el presupuesto del nivel central. El modelo 
muestra que el cupo teórico que genera no es más que una forma indirecta de 
determinar la transferencia de nivelación entre el gobierno central y la corres-
pondiente región. Que el cálculo del cupo se haga de forma directa o indirecta 
es per se completamente neutro: las jurisdicciones forales operan exactamente 
bajo las mismas condiciones financieras que las comunidades de régimen común, 
a pesar de que en estas últimas la transferencia se calcule directamente como la 
diferencia entre las necesidades de gasto y la capacidad fiscal. En el contexto de 
nuestro modelo, la causa de la ventaja económica de las jurisdicciones forales es 
el particular procedimiento de imputación desarrollado por la ley del cupo, que 
claramente establece un sesgo en favor de las jurisdicciones forales y, por tanto, 
en contra de las comunidades de régimen común. Una ventaja económica de las 
comunidades forales respecto del agregado de todas las comunidades de régimen 
común que, aun estando restringida al ámbito del diseño del cupo, hemos estimado 
en un 29,8% para el País Vasco y en un 28,2% para Navarra. Estos cálculos deben 
considerarse como un límite inferior de la ventaja foral. El modelo tiene claras 
implicaciones de reforma.
clasificación JEL: H77.
Palabras clave: financiación regional, España, sistema foral, sistema común.
1. Introduction
Regional finance in Spain is not implemented by means of a unique system, but 
through two different systems that coexist with each other. One, known as the foral 
or cupo system, is applied to two autonomous communities —the Basque Country 
and Navarre— and the other, known as the common system is applied to the other 
fifteen autonomous communities 1. This coexistence is not without problems. For 
equal responsibilities, the amount of per capita finance provided by the foral system 
is believed to be much larger than that of the common system. With respect to non-
foral communities, available estimates range from 32% to 47% in favour of foral 
communities 2. Considering that both the Basque Country and Navarre are among the 
richest Spanish regions, this generates a widespread sense of injustice among com-
mon communities. As Zubiri (2007) points out, the coexistence of these two systems 
is potentially the most serious threat to the stability of the overall process of political 
and economic decentralization in Spain.
1 Strictly, there are three other jurisdictions with special regimes: the Canary Islands and the autono-
mous cities of Ceuta y Melilla, which are a hybrid between municipalities and autonomous communities.
2 See Zubiri (2007), Buesa (2007 and 2009), Monasterio (2010) and De la Fuente (2011). In Section 
8 below we analyse these estimates in more detail and compare them with our own results.
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The origins of the Basque foral system go back to the end of the XIX century, 
and particularly to the Spanish central government «Real Decreto» of February 28th, 
1878 that creates the precedent of the present foral system. Concerning Navarre, the 
birth of the foral regime is associated to the «Ley Paccionada» of August 16th, 1841. 
During the Spanish Civil War, the foral regime was abolished in two of the three 
provinces that form the Basque Country (Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya) but retained in the 
third (Álava) and also in Navarre. And after the Franco regime it was re-instituted 
in the two foral autonomous communities through what is known as the Economic 
Concert (Concierto Económico) for the Basque Country and the Economic Agree-
ment (Convenio) for Navarre 3.
The legal foundations of the Economic Concert are, first, the Spanish Constitu-
tion (Boletín Oficial del Estado, BOE, 1978), which in its First Additional Provision 
«protects and respects» these traditional arrangements for the Basque Country and 
Navarre; second, the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country (Estatuto de Au-
tonomía del País Vasco, BOE 1979), the basic institutional rule of this region that 
determines its tax and expenditure responsibilities and sets the principles for, among 
other matters, the political and economic relations with the central administration of 
the Spanish State; third, the law that regulates the Economic Concert (BOE 2007a); 
and fourth, the law (BOE 2007b) that determines the way to calculate the amount (the 
cupo) that the Basque Country has to pay the central administration «to contribute to 
the finance of the general expenses of the State» 4.
Regarding the Navarre Agreement, in addition to the Constitution, the legal foun-
dations are the Organic Law of Reintegration and Improvement of the Foral Regime 
of Navarre (BOE 1982), which is the equivalent of the Statute of Autonomy of Na-
varre, and the law that establishes the Economic Agreement between the State and 
the Foral Community of Navarre (BOE 2007c) and determines the way to calculate 
the amount that Navarre has to pay the central administration (the aportación). In 
what follows, and whenever there is no need to be specific, we will call all this set of 
legal texts, «the law», and use the term cupo to refer to both the Basque Country cupo 
and the Navarre aportación, and the term concerted taxes/revenues to refer both the 
Basque concerted and the Navarre agreed taxes/revenues.
Both the Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country are 
very vague as to the concrete design of the Economic Concert. The Statute of Au-
tonomy, however, in its article 41.2.f states that the Economic Concert «will be ap-
plied in accordance with the principle of solidarity referred to in articles 138 and 
156 of the Constitution». Article 138.1 states that «the State guarantees the effective 
realization of the principle of solidarity [...], insuring the establishment of a proper 
and just economic balance among the various parts of Spanish territory [...]»; and 
article 138.2 states that «The differences between the Statutes of the Autonomous 
Communities will, in no case, imply economic or social privileges». Article 156 ac-
3 See Alonso-Olea (1995) for the historical precedents of the foral system.
4 See Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country (BOE 1979), article 41.2.d).
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knowledges the principle of financial autonomy of the regions in conformity with 
the principles of coordination and solidarity. Also, the Spanish Constitutional Court 
clearly states that solidarity is a central competence and that it comprises the procure-
ment of regional development as well as fiscal equalization (Constitutional Court 
Judgment No. 31/2010, of June 28) 5.
The basic elements of the foral system are presented in the law that regulates the 
Economic Concert, which defines the tax responsibilities of the Basque autonomous 
community and refers to a further law that sets the concrete procedure to calculate 
the cupo. In particular, the Basque Country, subject to some harmonizing restrictions, 
has a considerable degree of responsibility for the design, administration, collection 
and inspection of all taxes accrued in its territory except for customs tariffs 6. The final 
piece of legislation is the law that establishes the calculation procedure and the actual 
amount of the cupo. The cupo is meant to measure the cost of the general expenses of 
the State. To that end, the procedure adopted is to apply a fraction representative of 
the relative size of the Basque Country to the Spanish budget entitlements associated 
to those responsibilities that have not been transferred to the community.
The Navarre legislation is less precise as to the solidarity requirements, but the 
basic law of the system, BOE (1982), in its articles 1 and 45, establishes as well that 
Navarre will maintain a relationship of solidarity with respect to all other communi-
ties of the Spanish nation. In any case, the Navarre legislation is subject to the Span-
ish Constitution and to its articles 138 and 156. Essentially, the elements of the foral 
system and the procedure to calculate the cupo are the same in both Navarre and the 
Basque Country. We discuss this procedure in more detail below.
The legal base of the common system of regional finance is the LOFCA (BOE 
2009a), the basic law that establishes the principles of the system, and the concrete 
provisions of the present regional finance model are set in the Common Regime Re-
gions Financing Law (BOE, 2009b). The system of regional finance for the fifteen 
common regime autonomous communities consists of ceded national taxes, and a va-
riety of equalization transfers, and its aim is the equalization of normative resources 
per unit of need, so that the same service level can be provided by all regions irre-
spective of their fiscal capacity 7. Differently from the foral system, ceded taxes do 
not cover the whole range of taxes accrued in the territory of the respective commu-
nity. From 1997, several degrees of discretion were granted to regional governments 
vis-à-vis some of the ceded taxes, allowing autonomous communities to set tax rates 
and establish tax credits and allowances. Thus, progressively, ceded taxes have in 
fact become own taxes for regional governments, from an economic point of view 8.
5 See López-Laborda (2011).
6 Social Security contributions are excluded from the system. Actually, tax competences do not corre-
spond to the autonomous community, but to the three historical territories, that is to say, the three provinces.
7 Until 2009 the objective was the full equalization of regional services. Since then, with the last 
reform, the aims of the system are more confused. In this work we assume, as an approximation, that the 
common system is one of full equalization. See Zabalza and López-Laborda (2011).
8 See Zabalza and López-Laborda (2011) and López-Laborda and Monasterio (2007) for a more 
detailed description of the common system of regional finance.
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Past attempts to account for the larger amount of resources that the foral sys-
tem generates have been based on the identification of measurement errors of the 
concepts involved and/or a faulty design of the cupo formula. Castells et al. (2005), 
Buesa (2009 and 2010) and Monasterio (2010) identify both types of deficiencies in 
their respective works, De la Fuente (2011) concentrates on the first one and López-
Laborda (2007) on the second.
In this paper we show that even restricting ourselves to the problems posed by 
the faulty design of the cupo formula, it is possible to identify a substantial positive 
difference in the amount of resources that the foral system generates vis-à-vis the 
common system of regional finance. We formally show how the foral system stands 
in relation to the non-foral system and to the central jurisdiction budget, thus model-
ling the whole Spanish regional finance system. To measure the economic advantage 
of the foral system we compare it with a reference position in which foral jurisdic-
tions, despite using the cupo formula, have no economic advantage over non-foral 
jurisdictions. Holding constant tax effort and the set of expenditure responsibilities 
that foral and non-foral communities have, we measure the unjustified advantage of 
the foral over the non-foral system by the difference in economic resources that the 
actual, legal cupo generates with respect to the reference cupo.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we develop a formal 
model which integrates the foral or cupo system applied to the Basque Country and 
Navarre, the common system applied to the other fifteen Spanish autonomous com-
munities, and the central government budget. Using this model, we derive the refer-
ence cupo, a transfer consistent with what is established by the Constitution and the 
Statutes of Autonomy of the foral communities. In Section 3 we show how expen-
diture and tax responsibilities are distributed between foral, non-foral and central 
jurisdictions. In Section 4, still keeping with the formal development of the model, 
we identify the reference cupo in terms of the expenditure and tax responsibilities 
of the different levels of government and compare it with the actual, legal cupo. In 
Section 5 we calibrate empirically the model, and in Section 6 we evaluate the refer-
ence position of the whole regional finance system and see how this position changes 
when the legal cupos of the two foral jurisdictions are introduced. In Section 7 we 
measure the advantage granted to the foral jurisdictions and identify the sources of 
that advantage. In Section 8 we compare our results with others obtained in the lit-
erature and in Section 9 we examine the normative implications of our results. Sec-
tion 10 concludes.
2. The model
The purpose of this section is to develop a model that captures the main char-
acteristics of the foral and common systems and shows how they fit in the overall 
framework of regional finance. We start with a very simple model, which helps to 
identify the nature of the foral system and the reference cupo, and then add more 
realistic features to it in order to analyse the coexistence of the two systems.
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2.1. The simple logic of the foral system: the reference cupo 9
Consider the budget of a unitary economy,
 ,E T D= +  (1)
where E is expenditure, T is tax revenue and D is the public deficit. In order to reduce 
the argument to its essential elements, suppose this economy decides to decentralize 
expenditure and revenue, and for that purpose establishes two overlapping jurisdic-
tions over the whole of the national territory: the central jurisdiction which we index 
with the exponent c, and the autonomous jurisdiction which we index with the expo-
nent a. Together with decentralization, it is decided to assign the recourse to debt fi-
nance exclusively to the central jurisdiction. After decentralization, the consolidated 
budget of the two jurisdictions is:
 .E E T T Da c a c+ = + +  (2)
Expenditure, Ea and Ec, and revenue, T a and T c are the exogenous variables 
of this model, established normatively as part of the decentralization decision. Ea 
and Ec are the normatively assigned expenditures; that is, the expenditure needs 
that allow to provide services at a given standard level. T a and T c are the norma-
tive tax revenues; that is, the tax/fiscal capacity of the two jurisdictions, in terms 
of the revenues that at a standard tax effort can be collected from the correspond-
ing basis. D is, as in the unitary economy, the endogenous deficit that results from 
the normatively chosen levels of expenditure and revenue for the two jurisdic-
tions. That is,
 ,D E T= -  (3)
where E E Ea c= +  and .T T Ta c= +
To motivate the actual situation of the two foral communities, suppose that the 
distribution of responsibilities is not uniform across jurisdictions. The autonomous 
jurisdiction is assigned a tax capacity which is larger than its expenditure needs. 
Therefore, in the central jurisdiction expenditure exceeds the resources obtained via 
tax and debt. That is,
 .E T E T D          a a c c&1 2 +  (4)
Given this distribution of responsibilities, a transfer from the autonomous to the cen-
tral jurisdiction is needed so that both of them can finance their expenditure needs. 
Call this transfer C (for cupo). To get the definition of this transfer is useful to rewrite 
the consolidated budget (2) as
.T E E T Da a c c- = - -
9 This section is largely based on Zabalza (2011).
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Written like this, and account taken of (4), the consolidated budget restriction is telling 
us that the vertical fiscal gap of the two jurisdictions must be the same in absolute terms:
 .T E C E T Da a c c- = = - -  (5)
The transfer C, therefore, can be measured in two different ways: one that opts 
for the left hand side of expression (5),
 ;C T Ea a= -  (6)
and another that opts for the right hand side of expression (5),
 .C E T Dc c= - -  (7)
We call (6) the direct measure of the transfer, which we associate to a «common 
system», and (7) the indirect measure of the transfer, which we associate to a «foral 
system». Any of the two options obviously yields the same result, but the second —ex-
pression (7)— is a rather cumbersome and indirect way of approaching the problem: 
it defines the transfer (the cupo), which is an endogenous variable, in terms of the 
deficit, which is also an endogenous variable, while it could have been directly defined 
in terms of only exogenous variables of the autonomous jurisdiction as the difference 
between tax capacity and expenditure needs, as shown in expression (6).
In the context of this overlapping jurisdictions model, as expression (7) states, 
the cupo that the autonomous jurisdiction has to pay to the central jurisdiction equals 
the expenditure of the central jurisdiction (that is, the expenditure that has not been 
decentralized) minus the sum of resources that this jurisdiction obtains from tax rev-
enue and new debt. Given that in this simple model the territory of both jurisdictions 
is the same, this is the tax revenue obtained by the central government in the territory 
of the autonomous jurisdiction, and the deficit that has been generated by the shortfall 
of revenue respect expenditure also in the territory of the autonomous jurisdiction. 
The model thus identifies the cupo that covers the vertical fiscal gap of the central 
jurisdiction (the cost of the common national expenses net of the taxes and new debt 
raised by the central government) and at the same time allows the autonomous juris-
diction to finance its expenditure needs given its assigned tax capacity: we call this 
cupo, the reference cupo.
This can also be seen by noticing that the model we are in fact using is formed by 
the respective budgets of the two jurisdictions,
 ,E T C Dc c= + +  (8)
 .E T Ca a= -  (9)
This is a sequential system of two equations in two unknowns, C and D. In terms 
of exogenous variables, the cupo is obtained from equation (9), C T Ea a= - and, giv-
en the cupo, the deficit is obtained from equation (8) as D E T= - .
Despite its simplicity, the model generates an equalizing transfer from the auton-
omous to the central jurisdiction, the reference cupo, that —as we shall see below— 
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shares the structure of the actual cupo, but not its results. The model also unveils the 
dual character of this transfer. It can be defined following the cupo-type structure 
—expression (7)— but it can also be defined more directly —expression (6)— as the 
difference between tax capacity and expenditure needs. This duality is independent 
of the assumption that the tax revenue of the autonomous jurisdiction exceeds its nor-
mative expenditure. It would still exist if the assumption was the opposite, only that 
then the transfer would go from the central to the autonomous jurisdiction.
2.2. The foral and common systems of regional finance
The purpose of this section is to show that the above results follow through when 
instead of only one autonomous jurisdiction we more realistically consider the exis-
tence of a plurality of autonomous jurisdictions. Concretely, suppose that in addition 
to the central jurisdiction considered in the previous section, we now consider two 
foral jurisdictions, indexed by bc (for Basque Country) and n (for Navarre), and one 
non-foral jurisdiction, indexed by nf, which represents the aggregate of the other 
fifteen autonomous communities. Territorially, these three autonomous jurisdictions, 
which do not overlap, cover the whole of the national territory. The consolidated 
budget is:
 ,E E E E T T T R Dbc n nf c bc n nf c+ + + = + + + +  (10)
where Ebc, En, Enf and Ec are the normatively established levels of expenditure of the 
four jurisdictions (i.e., the expenditure needs); Tbc, Tn, Tnf the normative tax revenue 
of respectively the Basque Country and Navarre and the aggregate of the fifteen non-
foral autonomous communities (i.e., the tax capacity); D the public deficit; and Rc the 
central jurisdiction revenue, also in normative terms, which we assume is obtained 
not only from taxation, Tc, but also from sources other than taxes, which we denomi-
nate ORc. In addition, the tax revenue of the central government, Tc comes from taxes 
partially transferred to the autonomous jurisdictions, PTTc, and not transferred taxes, 
NTTc. That is,
 R T OR T PTT NTT R PTT NTT OR;    ;   c c c c c c c c c c`= + = + = + +  (11)
We also assume that the recourse to debt finance is assigned exclusively to the central 
government.
Again, to take into account the fact that foral communities are relatively richer than 
the average of the non-foral communities and that the extent of tax capacity that has 
been ceded to them is much larger than that ceded to non-foral communities, we as-
sume that the distribution of tax capacity is not uniform across jurisdictions: in the two 
foral jurisdictions tax revenue exceeds expenditure, while in the non-foral jurisdiction 
it falls short. And regarding the central jurisdiction we assume that tax revenue, plus 
non-tax revenue, plus resources obtained through debt exceed expenditure. That is,
 , .E T E T E T E T OR D  < ,     and  bc bc n n nf nf c c c1 2 1 + +
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This is an assumption that adds empirical content to our model, but in no way condi-
tions the results obtained. Had we disaggregated the non-foral jurisdiction into the 
fifteen autonomous communities of which it is composed, we would see that for the 
richest of them, despite a much lower level of cession of tax capacity, the transfer 
generated: a) would be negative, as it happens in the case of the two foral communi-
ties; and b) could perfectly well be represented in terms of the cupo-type structure, as 
it is the case for all communities, consistently with the duality result unveiled in the 
simple model of Section 2.1.
Suppose the central jurisdiction is the administrator of the whole system of re-
gional finance. Given the above vertical fiscal gaps, to enable the four jurisdictions to 
finance their expenditure needs, two transfers (cupos) from the foral communities to 
the central jurisdiction, Cbc and Cn, and another transfer from the central to the non-
foral jurisdiction, which we denote by S, are needed. With these transfers, the budgets 
of the four jurisdictions are:
 ,E C Tbc bc bc+ =  (12.1)
 E C Tn n n+ =   (12.2)
 ,E T Snf nf= +  (12.3)
 .E S R C C Dc c bc n+ = + + +  (12.4)
The model thus considers the whole central jurisdiction budget, expression (12.4), 
but regarding the three autonomous jurisdictions, expressions (12.1) to (12.3), only 
the budgets that correspond, in normative terms, to their respective regional finance 
system. This asymmetry is needed to represent actual legal arrangements, according 
to which while the regional finance system of the non-foral jurisdiction is defined 
only in terms of expenditure needs and ceded fiscal capacity, the cupo paid by the 
two foral communities is defined making use (through the public deficit) of the full 
budget of the central administration.
Equations (12) form a sequential system of four equations in four unknowns, 
Cbc, Cn, S and D, where the exogenous variables are the expenditure needs, Ebc, En, 
Enf and Ec, and the tax/revenue capacities, Tbc, Tn, Tnf, and Rc. The first equation gives 
the solution for Cbc; the second, the solution for Cn; the third, the solution for S; and, 
given Cbc, Cn and S, the fourth solves for D.
 ,C T Ebc bc bc= -  (13.1)
 C T En n n= -  (13.2)
 ,S E Tnf nf= -  (13.3)
 ,D E R= -  (13.4)
where E E E E E R T T T Randbc n nf c bc n nf c= + + + = + + + .
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Can the dual property unveiled by the simple model of Section 2.1 be also predi-
cated of the present, more complex structure? The answer is yes. Take the consoli-
dated budget (10) and rewrite it as follows:
 
,
T E T E T E
E R D E R D E R D
bc bc n n nf nf
cbc cbc bc cn cn cn cnf cnf nf
- + - + -













 , ,D E R E E T R f bc n   f tf tf f cf f cf= - = + - + =` ` `j j j   (15)
and
 .D E R E E T Rnf tnf tnf nf cnf nf cnf= - = + - +` `j j  (16)
Etf is total expenditure in the corresponding foral territory by both foral and central 
jurisdictions and Rtf total (tax and non-tax) revenue obtained by both jurisdictions 
in the corresponding foral territory; Etnf and Rtnf are the equivalent concepts for the 
non-foral territory. Ecf is central government expenditure in the corresponding foral 
territory and Ecnf that in the non-foral territory; Rcf is central revenue obtained from or 
imputed to the corresponding foral territory and Rcnf that obtained from or imputed to 
the non-foral territory. By construction, E E E Ecbc cn cnf c+ + = and R R R Rcbc cn cnf c+ + = , 
and therefore D D D Dbc n nf+ + = .
As we found in the simple model of Section 2.1, it turns out that in expres-
sion (14) the three parentheses on the left hand side (LHS) of the equality sign, which 
from expressions (13.1) to (13.3) are respectively the reference cupos for the Basque 
Country and Navarre, and (the negative of) the transfer to the non-foral jurisdiction, 
are equal to the three parentheses on the right hand side (RHS) of the equality sign. 
This can readily be seen by substituting (15) and (16) in (14). Thus, the two cupos, 
, ,C f bc n f =` j, and the non-foral transfer, S, can in fact be expressed in two different 
ways:
 
, ,T E C E R D f bc n
E T S E R D
  f f f cf cf f
nf nf cnf cnf nf
- = = - - =




Of these two possibilities, and to depict the actual arrangements of the Spanish re-
gional finance system, we define the non-foral transfer S on the basis of the LHS 
option,
 ,S E Tnf nf= -  (17)
and the two cupos on the basis of the RHS option,
 , ,C E R D f bc n  f cf cf f= - - =` j   (18)
The non-foral transfer S, expression (17), is simply the amount needed to cover the 
vertical fiscal gap of the non-foral community measured in normative terms. And 
expression (18) are the two reference cupos.
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The consolidated budget (14) with the non-foral transfer and the two foral cupos 
shown explicitly is
 .T E T E S C C E R Dbc bc n n bc n cnf cnf nf- + - - = + + - -` ` `j j j  (19)
Under the assumptions made so far, equation (17) for the non-foral jurisdiction and 
the two equations (18) for the two foral jurisdictions are the three transfers of the 
system, and (19) is the formal representation of the way in which the two regimes of 
regional finance coexist within the consolidated budget of the public sector.
The two reference cupos and the non-foral transfer are equalising transfers inas-
much as they ensure that all jurisdictions, given their fiscal capacity, can finance their 
expenditure needs. But observe that the model does not say anything about the extent 
of this equalization, since up to this point we have not defined the terms on which 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are determined in each of the three autonomous 
jurisdictions. Given that the aim of the present model is to serve as the reference to 
which the actual, legal cupos are to be compared, it is important to set out explicitly 
the terms on which the normative expenditure and revenue of each autonomous juris-
diction are defined. We do that in the following section.
3. Distribution of expenditure and tax responsibilities
So far, responsibilities for each jurisdiction, both in expenditure and tax revenue, 
have been identified only by means of their institutional dimension. This is too gen-
eral for the purpose of this exercise, as it does not allow us to define precisely the 
reference position of the Spanish regional finance system and, with respect to this 
reference, to evaluate the economic advantage that the actual system grants the two 
foral communities. To these ends we need to be more precise as to the nature of re-
sponsibilities and how they are linked between jurisdictions.
3.1. National equivalent levels of expenditure and tax revenue
We specify the model in the simplest terms, assuming that given the total, na-
tional levels of the relevant concepts of both expenditure and taxes, the distribution 
of these totals between jurisdictions follows an explicit rule. Denote the national 
equivalent of expenditure at the level of responsibilities of the two foral communi-
ties as ,NE f bc nf =` j, and the corresponding concept for the non-foral community as 
NEnf , where these three levels are not necessarily equal 10. Then, we assume that the 
normative expenditure assigned to each jurisdiction is distributed between the foral 
and non-foral communities according to relative population. Population is thus the 
indicator of needs that we adopt for our model. Therefore,
 ,E NE E NE E NE,   and bc bc bc n n n nf nf nfa a a= = =  (20)
10 As we shall see below, in the Spanish system of regional finance, .NE NE NEbc n nf2 2
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where bca , na  and nfa  are the population shares of the Basque Country, Navarre and 
the non-foral jurisdiction respectively, and 1bc n nfa a a+ + = .
Although a simplification, this is approximately the criterion used to define ex-
penditure needs in the fifteen common autonomous communities and, given this, also 
the criterion to define the expenditure of the two foral communities if we want to 
construct a reference position in which the foral system does not generate any situa-
tion of advantage respect the non-foral jurisdiction.
Regarding taxes, denote the national equivalent of the tax revenue at the level of 
tax responsibilities of the two foral communities, corresponding to a given tax figure 
or to a given bundle of tax figures, as ,NT f bc nf =` j and the corresponding concept 
at the level of responsibilities of the non-foral community as NTnf . Then normative 
tax revenue is assumed to be distributed between foral and non-foral communities ac-
cording to relative income, which again is approximately the criterion used to define 
tax capacity of the non-foral communities. Thus,
 ,T NT T NT T NT,   and bc bc bc n n n nf nf nfb b b= = =  (21)
where bbc, bn and bnf are the income shares of the Basque Country, Navarre and the 
non-foral jurisdiction respectively, and 1bc n nfb b b+ + = .
By doing this we ensure that, for the same level of tax responsibilities, tax effort 
is the same in all jurisdictions. This is important in order to rule out that any position 
of advantage that may be identified is due to a higher tax effort by the foral jurisdic-
tions. Also, by assuming that (21) gives the accrued normative levels of tax revenue, 
we rule out the need to use adjustments in order to transform actual revenue obtained 
within a territory into accrued revenue according to the nature of the tax 11.
These strong assumptions are needed to ensure the manipulability of the model. 
They also set a reference of comparison which is clear, reasonable and totally represent-
able in formal terms. Specified like this, the model: a) shows that the indirect form of 
measuring the transfer between foral and central jurisdictions is not the reason why the 
foral communities obtain more resources than the non-foral communities; and b) is pre-
pared to identify the cause of the economic advantage that foral communities enjoy over 
non-foral communities, subject to full equalization, and the extent of this advantage.
3.2. Expenditure responsibilities
We distinguish four types of responsibilities, which measured by their respective 
national level are: EA, those expenditure responsibilities that because of their nature 
11 The model could be made more realistic by assuming that the distribution criteria are different for 
each tax. For example, by using the aggregate consumption share for VAT and the specific consumption 
shares for each of the different excise duties. But in order to keep the model simple we maintain our 
assumption since in the aggregate (19) turns out to be a fairly good approximation of the territorial distri-
bution of normative tax revenue. 
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cannot be decentralized; EB, those responsibilities that can be decentralized and are 
assigned to both foral and non foral autonomous jurisdictions; EC, those responsi-
bilities that can be decentralized and are only assigned to the two foral jurisdictions; 
and ED, those responsibilities that can be decentralized and are only assigned to the 
Basque Country.
Using assumption (20), this yields a convenient way of defining expenditure 
needs. In particular,
 ,E EB EC EDbc bca= + +` j  (22.1)
 ,E EB ECn na= +` j  (22.2)
 ,E EBnf nfa=  (22.3)
 .E EA EC EDc nf n nfa a a= + + +` j  (22.4)
It is easy to see that total assigned expenditure, E, is the sum of the four types of 
expenditure needs. Namely,
 .E E E E E EA EB EC EDbc n nf c= + + + = + + +  (23)
Also, the national equivalents of Ebc and En (which the law calls «assumed charg-
es») are NE EB EC EDbc = + +  and NE EB ECn = + , and the national equivalent of Ecbc 
and Ecn (which are called «not assumed charges»), NE EAcbc =  and NE EA EDcn = + .
Whereas Ebc, and En are Enf, as a matter of fact, defined restrictively within the set 
of expenditure responsibilities that have been decentralized (the principal ones being 
education, health and social services), Ec is a much wider concept that refers to the 
whole expenditure budget of the central government, including the purchase of finan-
cial assets (Chapter VIII of the Budget) and the amortization of financial liabilities 
(Chapter IX). The central government expenditure budget also includes the transfer S 
to the non-foral jurisdiction, but we consider this item separately from Ec. Thus, the 
formal representation of the expenditure side of the central government budget in our 
model is .E Sc +
3.3. Tax responsibilities and other revenues
We assume that the whole tax system, measured at the national level and in 
terms of tax capacity, is composed of four groups of tax figures: ST (shared taxes), 
taxes the revenue of which is shared between jurisdictions (these are Income Tax, 
VAT and excises); CT (corporation tax); OT (own taxes), taxes fully ceded to the 
autonomous jurisdictions (these include, among others, the net wealth tax, the in-
heritance and gift tax and the capital transfer tax). The fourth group of taxes is NTT c 
(not transferred taxes), which are central taxes (mainly custom tariffs and fees, and 
civil servants pension contributions) not transferred to any of the three autonomous 
jurisdictions.
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In addition to the four tax groups, we consider as well the concept already de-
fined ORc (other revenue), which as stated above corresponds to revenue obtained by 
the central jurisdiction from non-tax sources or from transfers other than the foral 
cupos. Consistently with the expenditure side, the revenue side of the central bud-
get also takes its most extensive form, including the sale of financial assets (Chap-
ter VIII). Formally, the revenue side of the central budget in our model is represented 
as R C Cc bc n+ + .
Using assumption (21) that states that tax capacity is distributed territorially ac-
cording to income, the correspondence between these tax concepts and those of the 
model is the following:
 ,T ST CT OTbc bcb= + +` j  (24.1)
 ,T ST CT OTn nb= + +` j  (24.2)
 ,T ST OTnf nfb c= +` j  (24.3)
 ,R PTT NTT OR ST CT NTT OR1c c c c nf c cb c= + + = - + + +` j: D  (24.4)
where 1bc n nfb b b+ + = , and c is the average proportion of ST shared by the non-foral 
autonomous jurisdiction with the central government. An implication of (24.4) is 
that, expressed in terms of the different types of taxes, central government revenue 
obtained from partially transferred taxes is:
 PTT ST CT1c nfb c= - +` j: D  (25)
The model shows the enormous extent of tax decentralization that the foral 
communities enjoy. They are the only jurisdictions that have full control over the 
collection, management and regulation of own taxes, shared taxes and the cor-
poration tax 12. In comparison, the non-foral communities only have full control 
over own taxes and have no responsibility over the corporation tax, and the central 
jurisdiction has responsibility over the corporation tax and shared taxes, but only 
within non-foral territory. The only tax revenue that escapes the control of the foral 
jurisdictions is that from not transferred taxes, NTTc, which are a relatively small 
part of the total tax base 13. It is easy to see that the sum of the tax capacity of the 
four jurisdictions is equal to the sum of the four national groups of taxes consid-
ered. That is,
 .T T T T T ST CT OT NTTbc n nf c c= + + + = + + +  (26)
12 In general, no regulation responsibilities exist in the case of VAT and excise duties.
13 The sum NTTc + ORc, the national equivalent of ,R f bc ncf =` j, is called in the law «total not con-
certed taxes and other revenue». So, ,NR NTT OR f bc n cf c c= + =` j. Also, the national equivalent of foral 
tax revenue, ,NT ST OT CT f bc n f = + + =` j, is called «total concerted taxes».
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3.4. The central government budget
Using equations (22.4) and (24.4) and adding the corresponding transfers to and 
from the autonomous jurisdictions, the central government budget is:
 
EA EC ED S
ST CT NTT OR C C D1
nf n f
nf
c c bc n
a a a
b c
+ + + +






Notice that the deficit shown is the deficit of the whole system, since by assump-
tion the normative budgets of the three autonomous jurisdictions are balanced 14.
3.5. Consolidated budget
The added detail about the different levels of expenditure and tax responsibilities 
yields a new form of the consolidated budget, which in order to see the correspon-
dence we show together with the previous forms. That is, the whole system can be 






E E E E T T T T OR D
EA EB EC ED ST CT OT NTT OR D
bc n nf c bc n nf c c
c c
= +
+ + + = + + + + +
+ + + = + + + + +
 (28)
4. Reference and legal cupos compared
4.1. Reference and legal cupos
The reference cupo is the cupo that follows from the model developed so far. 
That is, the cupo of a system in which expenditure needs are assigned to autonomous 
jurisdictions according to population and tax capacity according to income. With 
the reference cupo, the non-foral jurisdiction and the two foral jurisdictions have at 
their disposal the same amount of normative resources per unit of need. Therefore, 
with the reference cupo, differences in resources per unit of need between foral and 
non-foral communities can only arise from differences in the extent of expenditure 
responsibilities.
However, as we shall see below, this is not the case with the actual, legal cupo that 
in addition to the difference in resources justified by different levels of responsibili-
ties, generates as well an unjustified economic advantage over non-foral jurisdictions.
14 Call the deficit of the central government budget Dc. Using the budget of this jurisdiction giv-
en by (12.4), D E R S C Cc c c bc n= - + - +` j: D . The square bracket is equal to the net balance of the three 
autonomous jurisdictions. Therefore, D E R E R E Rc c c c c= - + - - -` ` `j j j, from which it follows that 
D E R Dc = - = .
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basque country
The reference cupo of the Basque Country —expression (18) above—, which for 
commodity we reproduce here
 ,C E R Dbc cbc cbc bc= - -  (18)
expressed in terms of the expenditure and tax concepts of equations (22) and (24), 
reads:
 ,C EA NTT OR E Rbc bc bc c c bc bca b a b= - + - -` `j j  (29)
where E EA EB EC= + +  and .R ST CT OT NTT ORc c= + + + +
The legal cupo, BOE (2007b), instead of using the expression (18) that comes out 
from the model, prescribes that its three terms be raised to their national equivalents, 
and the cupo be calculated as the resulting number times a given coefficient (called 
the imputation coefficient) which is meant to approximate the relative income of the 
foral jurisdiction.
Therefore, calling the legally prescribed cupo CbcL, the formula is,
 ,C i NE NR NDbcL bc cbcL cbcL bcL= - -` j  (30)
where ibc is the imputation coefficient and NEcbcL, NRcbcL and NDbcL the national equiv-
alents of, respectively, Ecbc, Rcbc and Dbc 15.
Expressed in terms of the expenditure and tax concepts of equations (22) and 
(24), the legal cupo reads:
 ,C i EA i NTT OR i E R1bcL bc bc cL cL bc r= - + - + -` `j j: D  (31)
where NTTcL and ORcL are the legal revenue measures of not transferred central taxes 
and non-tax central sources; and r, expressed as a fraction of E, is the resource pre-
mium (extra expenditure capacity) that the legal definition of the cupo bestows on the 
foral communities as compared to the reference definition.
navarre
Following the same procedure, the reference and legal cupos of Navarre are:
 ,C EA ED NTT OR E Rn n n c c n na b a b= + - + - -` ` `j j j  (32)
and
 .C i EA ED i NTT OR i E R1nL n n nf n cL cL na a r= + + - + - + -` ` `j j j: :D D  (33)
15 In the law, NEcbcL is called «total not assumed charges».
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4.2. Comparison
Clearly, the reference and legal cupos —expressions (29) and (31) for the Basque 
Country, and (32) and (33) for Navarre— are not the same: there are differences 
regarding the imputation coefficients and differences caused by the specification of 
the second and third terms. These differences are therefore prima facie evidence of 
the origin of the economic advantage enjoyed by the foral communities versus the 
non-foral communities.
basque country
For reference purposes, and to use the terminology of the legal cupo, let us call 
the three terms in these four expressions: the «not assumed expenditure» element; the 
«not concerted revenue» element and the «deficit» element. Subtracting (31) from 
(29), Cbc - CbcL, we have a measure of the extent to which the reference cupo exceeds 
the legal cupo, and thus an estimate of the overprovision of resources that the foral 
jurisdiction enjoys as compared to the non-foral jurisdiction. This difference is, in its 
turn, generated by a not assumed expenditure effect, NAEEbc, a not concerted revenue 
effect, NCREbc, and a deficit effect, DEbc.
In particular, the not assumed expenditure effect is
 ,NAEE i EAbc bc bca= -` j  (34)
which is clearly negative since abc < ibc. Therefore, the legal cupo overestimates 
the not assumed expenditure element of the reference cupo. This is at variance 
with previous results in the literature. Castells et al. (2005) and De la Fuente 
(2011) conclude that the legal cupo underestimates this element, among other 
things because the legal cupo does not take into account the amount S that the 
central jurisdiction transfers to the non-foral jurisdiction. But, as seen in (29), it 
is correct that S should not appear in this term. Indeed, transfers should be no 
part of the definition of expenditure responsibilities as they are essentially dif-
ferent. When all things wash out, as the consolidated budget shows, transfers no 
longer play a role as they do not use up resources, they simply move them from 
one jurisdiction to another to redistribute expenditure capacity (that is, capacity 
to use up resources).
The not concerted revenue effect is
 
.
NCRE i NTT OR





cL cL c c
b=- - +










The first term measures the effect of the difference in imputation coefficients; and 
the second, the effect of the difference between the measure of not concerted revenue 
used by the law and the reference not concerted revenue implied by the model. Given 
the proximity of the coefficients bbc and ibc, the first term is bound to be small, while 
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the value of the second depends on the difference between the legal and correct mea-
sures of not concerted revenue.
Finally, the deficit effect is
 .DE i E i R i Ebc bc bc bc bc bca b r=- - + - +` `j j  (36)
Since abc < ibc and consolidated expenditure E is positive and large, the first com-
ponent of this expression is bound to be positive and large. Given that bbc < ibc, the 
second component must be negative but, given the similarity of these two parameters, 
small. The third component, given the multiplication of two fractions, ibcr, must be 
positive and also small 16.
navarre
Following the same procedure for Navarre we find:
 ,NAEE i EA i EDn n n n n n nfa a a a= - + - +` `j j: D  (37)
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 ,DE i E i R i En n n n n na b r=- - + - +` `j j  (39)
which, although to a smaller scale, have the same properties as those discussed for 
the equivalent expressions of the Basque Country.
5. Empirical calibration of the model
The data to calibrate the model developed here are readily available: BOE (2007b 
and 2007c) give the required information to estimate the foral system as applied in 
the Basque Country and Navarre; the data on regional finance for non-foral autono-
mous communities are in MINHAP (2013b); and the Spanish central budget can be 
found in MINHAP (2013a). Based on these sources we present an empirical calibra-
16 The upshot of this comparison is that the two most significant elements are the not assumed 
expenditure effect (34) and the first component of the deficit effect (36). That is, under these simplifying 
assumptions, C C i EA i E i EA Ebc bcL bc bc bc bc bc bca a a- = - - - = - -` ` ` `j j j j. This is the strategy followed in 
López-Laborda (2007) to measure the difference between the transfer to the non-foral jurisdiction and the 
foral cupo. In terms of our model, from (23), EA E EB EC ED NEbc- =- + + =-` j , the national equivalent 
of the «assumed charges» by the Basque Country. Thus, the most significant part of the difference between 
Cbc and CbcL can be measured as C C i NEbc bcL bc bc bca- =- -` j , which essentially is the result obtained by 
López-Laborda (2007). Given that ibc bc1a  and foral expenditure large, this is clearly positive and large: 
the legal cupo significantly underestimates the correct cupo.
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tion of the model for 2007, which corresponds to the last year in which the foral 
system was specified 17.
5.1. Calibration strategy
The strategy is as follows: First we identify the reference position of the whole 
regional finance system, with respect to which the actual legal cupo of the foral juris-
dictions can be compared. As shown above, the reference position is defined so that, 
for equal expenditure responsibilities, normative expenditure per capita of the foral 
jurisdictions is the same as average normative expenditure per capita of non-foral 
jurisdictions. Therefore, the differences in resources per capita between foral and 
non-foral jurisdictions observed in this position are due, and can be traced, to differ-
ences in responsibilities.
In defining the reference position we aim for consistency between different ju-
risdictions, and thus follow strictly the formal model above. An implication of the 
assumptions of the model is that there are no problems with the actual allocation of 
tax revenue to each jurisdiction and therefore that no adjustments are needed to trans-
form actual revenue obtained within the territory of the community in question into 
accrued revenue according to the nature of the tax. In reality, in addition to the cupo, 
there are other transfers aimed at this purpose, which, consistently with the way tax 
revenue is imputed to each jurisdiction, are not considered in the present model. This 
of course does not mean they are not important 18. It only means that in addition to the 
measure of foral advantage identified by the present model, all of it generated by the 
particular design of the imputation procedure prescribed by the law, there are other 
significant sources. To this extent, the measure of foral advantage found here must be 
considered a minimum estimate.
5.2. Calibration of the model
In the explanation of the calibration exercise we proceed first with tax responsi-
bilities, then with expenditure responsibilities and finally we calculate the reference 
cupos, the transfer to the non-foral jurisdictions and the deficit of the system.
tax responsibilities
Referring to equations (24.1) to (24.4), from INE we know that in 2007 rela-
tive income in the three autonomous jurisdictions was bbc = 0.0619, bn = 0.0168 and 
bnf = 0.9213.
17 As with the non-foral system, the foral cupo undergoes a major revision about every five years and 
in the interim is annually updated according to some agreed rule. The last year in which this major revision 
took place in the Basque Country was 2007, and in Navarre 2005.
18 A particular transfer that presents serious problems is the one destined to adjust VAT tax revenue 
from the production base under which it is collected to the consumption base under which it accrues. See 
Zubiri (2007), Monasterio (2010), De la Fuente (2011) and Zabalza (2012).
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The data provided by the Spanish State budget of 2007 (MINHAP, 2013a) allows 
us to estimate practically all the tax revenue elements of the model, and not only for 
the central government jurisdiction but also for the three decentralized jurisdictions. 
This is so because this source —in particular, Table IV.2.1 of the «Yellow Book»— 
gives information, by tax figures, not only about the tax revenue shared by the central 
government, but also about total tax revenue budgeted within the non-foral territory.
Total tax revenue budgeted for 2007 in the non-foral territory for the three groups of 
shared taxes (Income Tax, VAT and Excises) is €138,880 million. From this, it follows 
that bnfST = e138,880 million. Also, the share of this total that remains with the cen-
tral government is bnf (1 - c)ST = e86,973 million. These two pieces of information 
imply that the amount of shared taxes for the whole Spanish territory and the average 
proportion in which these taxes are shared between the central and the non-foral juris-
dictions are 19: ST = e150,747 million and c = 0,37. From the same source (MINHAP, 
2013a), we also know that bnf CT = e41,641 million. Therefore, the implied corporate 
tax revenue for the whole Spanish territory is CT = e45,199 million. Finally, from 
MINHAP (2013b), we know that bnf OT = e29,481 million and OT = 32,000 million.
Then using equations (24.1), (24.2) and (24.3) we find, in € million, the tax revenue 
of the three autonomous jurisdictions:ORC T bc = 14,106; T n = 3,839 and T nf = 81,388.
To find out the tax and non-tax revenue of the central government —expres-
sion (24.4)— we need to identify the values of NTT c and ORc. Central government 
revenue from not transferred taxes equals total central government tax revenue, T c, 
which from MINHAP (2013b) is €137,151 million, minus central government tax 
revenue from tax figures transferred and shared with the foral and non-foral jurisdic-
tions, PTT c. That is,
, , ,NTT T ST CT1 137 151 128 614 8 537 million.c c nfb c= - - + = - =` j: D
To calculate the central government revenue from non-tax sources, ORc, we must 
first identify central government total revenue, Rc, which is equal to total revenue as 
figured in the central government budget, €147,545 million, minus the sum of the 
two legal cupos, which is €3,046 million. Thus
 , , , ,R C C147 545 147 545 3 046 144 500 million,c bcL nL= - + = - =` j
where the two cupos, CbcL and CnL are obtained, respectively, from BOE (2007b) and 
BOE (2007c). Then,
 , , ,OR R T 144 500 137 151 7 348 million.c c c= - = - =
To summarize, the revenue side of the central government budget is
 ,R C C ST CT NTT OR C C1c bcL nL nf c c bcL nLb c+ + = - + + + + +` ` `j j j: D
19 The equivalent, all Spanish territory, tax revenue figures in €million for Income Tax, VAT and 
Excises are, respectively, 67,244; 62,858; and 20,645. 
The uneasy coexistence of the Spanish foral and common regional finance systems 139
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 37 (2017) – Páginas 119 a 152
or
 , , , , ,R C C 128 614 8 537 7 348 3 046 147 545 million.c bcL nL+ + = + + + =` j
As expressions (31) and (33) indicate, the definitions of the two legal cupos in-
corporate the concepts «revenue from central government not transferred taxes», 
NTT c, and «other non-tax central government tax revenue», ORC, but the values given 
by the law for these two concepts, particularly that for NTTc, differ somewhat from 
the values implied here. In particular,
 , ,NTT OR3 943 7 589 million   and    million.cL cL= =
For consistency, we use the values implied by the calibration exercise: ,NTT 8 537c =
million and ,OR 7 348c = million.
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the tax revenue results obtained from this calibra-
tion exercise.
Expenditure responsibilities
Referring to equations (22.1) to (22.4), we know from the regional data provided 
by INE (National Statistics Institute) that .0 0474bca = , .0 0134na =  and therefore 
.0 9392nfa = . From BOE (2007b) and BOE (2007c) we know that ,i 0 0624bc =  and 
,i 0 0160n = .
Also, we know from MINHAP (2013a) that total expenditure in the Spanish 
State budget, E S EA EC ED Sc nf n nfa a a+ = + + + +` j , is €188,417 million; and from 
BOE (2007b) that the value in the Spanish State budget of expenditure associated 
to the responsibilities of the Basque Country plus the transfer to the non-foral ju-
risdiction —article 4.3.b of BOE (2007b)—, the so called «assumed» expenditure 
EC ED Snf n nfa a a+ + +` j , is €102,665 million. Therefore, using (22.4) we conclude 
that the value of non-decentralized expenditure, (also known as «not assumed» ex-
penditure), is € , , , .EA 85 753 188 417 102 665 million,  = = -` j
Regarding the value of EB, we know from MINHAP (2013b) that 
€ ,S 32 615 million,=  and from our calculations above that € ,T 81 388 million.nf =
Therefore, the total expenditure capacity normatively given to the non-foral jurisdic-
tion is € , , , .E 114 003 81 388 32 615 million nf = = +` j Then, from equation (22.3) it 
follows that EB is equal to €121,381 million.
In equation (22.4), ECnfa  is the Spanish State budget expenditure associated to 
Navarre responsibilities. We know from the law that establishes the Navarre cupo, 
BOE (2007c), that the value of the assumed charges of this community plus the trans-
fer to the non-foral jurisdiction —article 54.2.b of BOE (2007c)— is €75,723 mil-
lion 20. Therefore, ,EC S 75 723nfa + = million and € ,EC 45 899 million= .
20 This figure refers to 2005 and has been updated to 2007 using the State expenditure budget in 
order to make it temporally consistent with the data of the Basque Country cupo.
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Finally, and using again (22.4), from the above it must be the case that EDn nfa a+` j  
is €26,942 million, ( , , )102 665 75 723= - , the difference between the Spanish State 
budget expenditure associated to the Basque Country and that associated to Navarre. 
Therefore, € ,ED 28 282 million.=
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the expenditure results of the calibration exercise.
table 1. Calibration of the model, reference position 2007
A. tax revenue (million €)
by type of tax  by jurisdiction  
ST 150,747 1. Tbc 14,106
CT 45,199 2. Tn 3,839
OT 32,000 3. Tnf 81,388
NTTc 8,537 4. Tc (4=4a+4b) 137,151
1. T 236,484     4a. (PTTc) (128,614)
    4b. (NTTc) (8,537)
5. T (5= +2+3+4) 236,484
non-tax revenue
2. ORc 7,349 6. ORc 7,349
total revenue
3. R (3=1+2) 243,832  7. R (7=5+6) 243,832
b. Expenditure (million €)
by type of expenditure by jurisdiction  
EA 85,753 Ebc 9,267
EB 121,381 En 2,242
EC 45,899 Enf 114,003
ED 28,282 Ec 155,803
E 281,314  E 281,314
c. Deficit, and cupos and transfer. Position of reference (million €)
Deficit  cupos and transfer
E 281,314 Cbc 4,839
R 243,832 Cn 1,597
D=E-R 37,482 S 32,615
   net transfer1 26,179
D. Parameters of the model
bbc 0.0619 abc 0.0474
bn 0.0168 an 0.0134
bnf 0.9213 anf 0.9392
∑bi 1.0000 ∑ai 1.0000
ibc 0.0624 c 0.3738
in 0.0160  r 0.0121
1 Net Transfer = S - Cbc - Cn.
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reference cupos, Ccb and Cn, transfer, S, and deficit, D
The way they have been calculated, the normative values of expenditure and tax 
revenue given above define a position of the system in which foral communities do 
not enjoy any economic advantage over the non foral communities. Thus the refer-
ence cupos for the Basque Country and Navarre, given by expressions (29) and (32), 
respectively, and the transfer to non-foral communities, given by expression (13.3), 
are (in €million) 4,839, 1,597 and 32,615 respectively.
Finally, the deficit generated by this reference position can be found from expres-
sion (13.4) as the difference between consolidated expenditure, E, and consolidated 
revenue, R. Consolidated expenditure is €281,314 million and consolidated revenue 
€243,832 million. Therefore, the deficit of the whole regional system (which norma-
tively coincides with the deficit of the central jurisdiction), expressed in €million, is 
D = 37,482. Panel C of Table 1 presents these results, and Panel D the value of the 
parameters of the model.
6. Reference and actual positions
6.1. Reference position
Table 2 shows the reference position. Expenditure per capita in the two foral 
jurisdictions, €4,327 in the case of the Basque Country and €3,701 in the case of 
Navarre, is the result of €2,685 received on account of the EB responsibilities that 
they share with the non-foral jurisdiction, plus €1,015 received on account of the EC 
specific responsibilities held by the two foral communities, plus €626 on account of 
the ED responsibilities held exclusively by the Basque Country. Therefore, in this 
comparison, where all jurisdictions are at their reference position, the 61.1% excess 
of resources that the Basque Country enjoys over the non-foral communities, and the 
37.8% excess held by Navarre, have to be seen as excesses justified by the larger set 
of expenditure responsibilities they hold.
These justified excesses may seem fairly large, in special for the Basque Country, 
but account has to be taken that foral communities have responsibilities, over and 
above those of non-foral communities, in areas, among others, such as the finance 
of Local Administrations, certain infrastructure expenditures or the tax administra-
tion of practically all taxes. Nevertheless, the possibility that the extra expenditure 
responsibilities of the foral jurisdictions are overvalued must be acknowledged. As 
shown in Section 5.2 above, the estimation of the non-foral transfer S and of EC and 
ED, which are the extra responsibilities of the Basque Country (EC+ED) and Na-

















+ + + =` j
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The first is the non-foral transfer that comes from the budget of the Autonomous 
Communities, MINHAP (2013b), and offers little doubt. The second corresponds to 
the assumed charges of Navarre that comes originally from the cupo law of this com-
munity, BOE (2007c) that corresponds to 2005 and has been updated to 2007. So here 
we have two possible sources of error measurement: the update from 2005 to 2007, 
and a possible over valuation of the €75,723 million assumed charges. And the third 
equation corresponds to the assumed charges of the Basque Country, BOE (2007b), 
which is also subject to possible over valuation 21. An over valuation of the assumed 
charges of any of these two communities, or of the two of them, would necessarily 
lead to a corresponding over valuation of our estimates of EC and ED. Since in his 
article we take official data at face value, the reader must keep in mind that this might 
lead to overestimate the justified differences due to extra expenditure responsibili-
ties, and therefore to underestimate the economic advantage of foral versus non-foral 
jurisdictions.
table 2. The Spanish system of regional finance. Year 2007.  
Reference cupos: expressions (29) and (32) (Million €)
 
Jurisdiction
Basque C. Navarre Non Foral Central Consolidated
Expenditure 9,267 2,242 114,003 155,803 281,314
Revenue 14,106 3,839 81,388 144,500 243,832
C 4,839 1,597 6,436 0
S   32,615 32,615 0
Deficit 0 0 0 37,482 37,482
E/N (€/N) 4,327 3,701 2,685 3,447 6,224
T/GDP (%) 21.7 21.7 8.4 13.3
R/GDP (%) 14.9 23.2
E: Expenditure; N: Population; T: Decentralized tax revenue; R: Total revenue; GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
If we call T the set of taxes that have been decentralized (that is, ST, CT and OT) 
the national territory can be divided in two parts where the jurisdictions involved 
have the same tax responsibilities (precisely ST, CT and OT): one the foral territory 
(Basque Country and Navarre), and the other the non-foral territory, where the rel-
evant tax revenue is the sum of that of the non-foral jurisdiction and that of the central 
jurisdiction. As the second row from the bottom of Table 2 shows, these two parts 
have the same average effective tax rate over GDP: 21.7% for each of the two foral 
jurisdictions, and also 21.7% for the sum of the non-foral and the central jurisdiction 
(21.7 = 8.4 + 13.3). This naturally is the result of assumption (21) used to assign tax 
21 See Monasterio (2010) and De la Fuente (2011) for an explanation of the reasons why these offi-
cial data may be over valuated. 
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capacity between jurisdictions according to income, and tells us that the measure of 
foral advantage that our model identifies is calculated for a given equal fiscal effort 
of the jurisdictions involved. In addition to the decentralized taxes that enter into the 
regional system, the central government obtains revenue from other taxes, NTTc, and 
from non-tax sources, ORc. As the last row of the table shows, when these items are 
added to the revenue of the central jurisdiction, the effective rate over GDP increases 
1.6 percentage points to a total of 14.9%.
6.2. Actual position
The actual position is shown in Table 3, where the cupos of the Basque Country 
and Navarre, instead of being calculated with the reference formulas (29) and (32) 
respectively, are calculated with the legally prescribed formulas (31) and (33).
table 3. The Spanish system of regional finance. Year 2007.  
Legal cupos: expressions (31) and (33) (Million €)
Jurisdiction
Basque C. Navarre Non Foral Central Consolidated
Expenditure 12,025 2,874 114,003 155,803 284,704
Revenue 14,106 3,839 81,388 144,500 243,832
C 2,081 965 3,046 0
S   32,615 32,615 0
Deficit 0 0 0 40,872 40,872
E/N (€/N) 5,614 4,744 2,685 3,447 6,299
T/GDP (%) 21.7 21.7 8.4 13.3
R/GDP (%)    14.9 23.2
E: Expenditure; N: Population; T: Decentralized tax revenue; R: Total revenue; GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
Two comments are in order concerning these two legal cupos. First, whereas 
the values in the Basque cupo are exactly the ones of year 2007 that figure in BOE 
(2007b), the values of the Navarre cupo, as mentioned above, are updated from the 
2005 values that figure in BOE (2007c). Second, we only consider the cupo affected 
by the imputation coefficient. To this, the legally calculated cupos add other adjust-
ments (the most important of which concerns direct taxes) for a total value of -€516 
million in the Basque Country case and -€123 million in the Navarre case. Consis-
tently with our assumption above that the reference tax figures are correctly allocated 
to each territory, we ignore these adjustments in what follows.
Table 3 shows approximately how in 2007 the whole regional finance system must 
have looked like with these legal cupos. In fact, Table 3 presents the actual 2007 ob-
served position for central and non-foral jurisdictions, the actual legal cupos and, given 
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normative revenue, the implied levels of expenditure. Since the legal cupos are lower 
than the correct ones, expenditure of the foral communities is larger than in the reference 
position, and so is the deficit of the system. The way the reference position has been 
defined, the deficit of the actual position is precisely the actual 2007 budget deficit of 
the central jurisdiction. Since by assumption we keep revenue of all four jurisdictions, 
and expenditure of all jurisdictions except the foral ones, unchanged, the extra resources 
assigned to foral communities are all absorbed by the deficit of the system. With this, 
we ensure the correspondence between the actual position of Table 3 and observed data.
7. Foral advantage and its sources
7.1. Foral advantage
With the legally prescribed cupos, the Basque Country obtains €5,614 per capita 
and Navarre €4,744, while the non-foral jurisdiction obtains €2,685. The Basque 
Country has 109.1% and Navarre 76.7% more resources per capita than those of the 
non-foral jurisdiction. Of these excesses, and as we have seen above, 61.1% are justi-
fied by the larger set of the Basque Country expenditure responsibilities, and 37.8% 
by those of Navarre.
table 4. Economic advantage of the foral system  
Excess of resources per capita over those of non-foral system  
(Percentages)
Basque C. Navarre BC+N
Total excess 109.1 76.7 101.9
Justified excess*  61.1 37.8  56.0
Unjustified excess  29.8 28.2  29.5
* Justified because of the larger set of expenditure responsibilities of foral over non-foral jurisdictions.
Therefore, as Table 4 shows, the unjustified excess, the economic advantage that 
the foral system enjoys over the non-foral system of regional finance, is 29.8% in the 
case of the Basque Country and 28.2% in the case of Navarre. In all, the two foral 
communities have at their disposal 29.5% more resources per capita than the foral 
communities. These are the unjustified differences in resources that result from the 
present exercise.
7.2. The sources of foral advantage
Having empirically calibrated the model, we can now evaluate the components of 
these differences. Beginning with the Basque Country, the difference between refer-
The uneasy coexistence of the Spanish foral and common regional finance systems 145
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 37 (2017) – Páginas 119 a 152
ence and legal cupos, Cbc - CbcL, is €2,758 million. The legal cupo (€2,081 mil-
lion) is 57.0% smaller than what it should be (€4,839 million). With reference to 
Table 5, the not assumed expenditure effect, NAEEbc, is -€1,288 million. On this 
account, therefore, legal provisions overestimate the Basque Country cupo. The 
same, although with a much smaller absolute size (-€263 million), occurs with the 
not concerted revenue effect, NCREbc, which is generated in its practical totality by 
the difference between the revenue of not transferred taxes considered in the legal 
definition of the cupo and the revenue that for these taxes figures in the 2007 central 
government budget. Finally, the deficit effect, Dbc, is €4,309 million, thus meaning 
that these same legal provisions, in net terms, severely underestimate the cupo of this 
autonomous community.
table 5. Decomposition of the difference between reference 
and legal cupos in the Basque Country  
(Million €)
1. Not assumed expenditure effect, NAEEbc
    (abc - ibc)EA -1,288
 Total NAEEbc -1,288
2. Not concerted revenue effect, NCREbc
   i NTT ORbc bc c cb- - +` `j j  8
   i NTT OR NTT ORbc cL cL c c+ + - +` `j j: D -272
 Total NCREbc -263
3. Deficit effect, DEbc
    i Ebc ba- -` j 4,224
    i Rbc bcb+ -` j -126
    i Ebcr+ 212
 Total DEbc 4,309
 Total Cbc - CbcL difference (1+2+3) 2,758
In all, the legal cupo of the Basque Country is €2,758 million smaller than what 
it should be if the normative resources per capita of this community were, for equal 
responsibilities, the same as those of the non-foral jurisdiction. The three effects cor-
respond respectively to expressions (34), (35) and (36).The results of this decompo-
sition are in agreement with Monasterio (2010), for whom the main problem lies in 
the existence of a sizeable deficit effect, but somewhat different from those of De la 
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Fuente (2011), who identifies the not assumed expenditure effect as the main culprit 
of the foral economic advantage.
Table 6 shows the decomposition for the case of Navarre. Although with much 
lower absolute numbers, we see that the general pattern of effects is similar to that 
found for the Basque Country. Again, the not assumed charges effect is negative, 
−€275 million; the not concerted revenue effect is also negative but relatively 
small in absolute terms, −€83 million; and by far the largest is the deficit effect, 
€990 million. In total, the legal Navarre cupo (€965 million) is 39.6% smaller 
than what it should be (€1,597 million) if the normative resources per capita of 
this community were, for equal responsibilities, the same as those of the non-foral 
jurisdiction.
table 6. Decomposition of the difference between reference 
and legal cupos in Navarre (Million €)
1. Not assumed expenditure effect, NAEEn
 i EAn na -` j -223
 i i ED1n n n nfa a+ - -` j: D -52
 Total NAEEn -275
2. Not concerted revenue effect, NCREn
 i NTT ORbc n c cb- - +` `j j -13
  i NTT OR NTT ORn cL cL c c+ + - +` `j j: D -70
 Total NCREn -83
3. Deficit effect, DEn
 i En na- -` j 730
 i Rn nb+ -` j 205
 i Enr+  54
 Total DEn 990
 Total Cn - CnL difference (1+2+3) 632
8. Comparison with other results
In the comparison of our results with those of other authors, we must keep in 
mind the different approaches and methodologies used, and the variety of ques-
tions posed. For instance, the present exercise only looks at the problems caused 
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by the design of the legal cupo (and particularly by the imputation procedure 
legally prescribed) and does not consider other transfers such as the VAT adjust-
ment, nor does look into the way official figures for the not assumed charges have 
been arrived at. For these reasons, as has been pointed out above, our measure of 
foral advantage must be taken as a minimum estimate. Having said that, we be-
lieve it is informative to put our results side by side with those obtained by other 
authors.
As Table 7 shows, in general and consistently with our previous comment, our 
exercise yields estimates which are below those found by other authors. The differ-
ence is not very large with respect to Buesa (2007 and 2009) and Monasterio (2010): 
-6.6% and -9.1% respectively; but quite significant with respect to Zubiri (2007) 
and De la Fuente (2011): -53.4% and -36.3% respectively.
table 7. Comparison with other estimates of foral advantage  
Excess of resources per capita over non foral system 
(Percentages) 
Table 41 Zubiri2 Buesa3 Monasterio4 De la Fuente5
BC total 109.1 112.5 114.0 97.6
N total  76.7  88.8
BC+N total 101.9 107.3
BC unjustified  29.8 64.0  31.9  32.8 46.8
N unjustified  28.2 65.0  37.0
BC+N unjustified  29.5 65.0  32.9   
1 Year 2007.
2 Zubiri (2007). Year 2002. Original estimates of excess in terms of resources per capita. Gross of effect of VAT adjust-
ment. 
3 Buesa (2007) for Basque Country cupo (year 2007) and Buesa (2009) for Navarre cupo (year 2005). Original esti-
mates in terms of cupo advantage, which are applied to reference position (Table 1) to convert the excess in resources 
per capita.
4 Monasterio (2010). Year 2002. Original estimate in terms of cupo advantage, which is applied to reference position 
(Table 1) to convert the  excess into resources per capita. Net of effect of VAT adjustment that would explain an addi-
tional 14.5% of excess of resources per capita.
5 De la Fuente (2011). Year 2007. Original estimate of excess in terms of resources per capita. Net of effect of VAT 
adjustment that would explain an additional 8.2% of excess resources per capita.
The difference between ours and Zubiri’s results is in part due to the fact that his 
estimates include the effect of the VAT adjustment while ours, as explained above, do 
not. Although Zubiri’s paper gives no information on the extent of this effect, if we 
assume that it explains 14.5% of excess resources per capita —following the Monas-
terio (2010) estimate, which also refers to the year 2002— then the Zubiri’s measure 
of the foral advantage of the Basque Country, net of the VAT effect, would be a 43.2% 
excess of resources per capita, which is closer to our result.
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Regarding the difference with De la Fuente’s (2011) result, account must be 
taken of the fact that our estimates are generated exclusively by the deficient design 
of the legal cupo, and that, without questioning them, we have taken official data as 
valid. In his work, on the other hand, De la Fuente identifies deficiencies in these of-
ficial data, particularly in the official measure of the not assumed charges, which he 
examines and reconstructs in a reasoned fashion 22.
9. Normative implications
The model developed here has well defined normative implications regarding 
the design of the cupo/aportación. The first is that the legal definition incurs in a lot 
of redundancies that serve no purpose and should be eliminated. Perhaps the most 
intriguing feature of the cupo is the ample manner in which the deficit is defined. 
This affects both the reference and the legal cupos; let us illustrate the issue with the 
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Clearly, there are a lot of redundant variables that can be cancelled out without 
altering the value of the cupo. Indeed, if we do that we are left with the direct form of 
measuring the cupo, which is much simpler than the indirect one:
 .C ST CT OT EB EC ED T Ebc bc bc bc bcb a= + + - + + = -` `j j
But even if, for whatever reason, the indirect form is preferred, there is plenty of 
room to define all three terms of (29) much more parsimoniously: First, the NTTc and 
ORc elements in the not transferred revenue term cancel out with those in the revenue 
side of the deficit term. And second, EA, which includes all the financial operations 
of the central government, can be likewise narrowed down by excluding these opera-
tions both in the not assumed charges term and in the expenditure side of the deficit. 
Then, although still with one redundancy, the cupo would be defined in an indirect 
form but based only on the non-financial operations of the expenditure budget and the 
set of taxes involved in the foral finance system:
 ,C EA EA EB EC ED ST CT OTbc bc bc bca a b= - + + + - + +l l` `j j: D  
22 In addition to those presented in Table 7, there are other estimates of foral advantage which are 
not included in the table due to comparability issues. Castells et al. (2005) presents results with data that 
belongs to a much earlier year (1999) and the excesses (76.9% for the Basque Country and 73.3% for 
Navarre) are calculated with respect to a subset of the non-foral communities (Andalucía, Canary Islands, 
Catalonia, Galicia and Valencia). De la Fuente et al. (2014), provide measures of foral advantage referred 
to 2005, significantly larger than any of those considered in Table 7 (115.2% for the Basque Country and 
85.2% for Navarre), which are obtained in the context of the calculation of a system of territorial public 
accounts.
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where EA' are the expenditure responsibilities that cannot be decentralized, exclud-
ing those of financial nature (Chapters VIII and IX).
The second implication is that to determine the national equivalent of not as-
sumed charges, NEcbc, which in terms of our model is EA’, the national equivalent 
of assumed charges, NEbc, which in our model is EB EC ED+ +` j, should be sub-
tracted not from the total expenditure budget of the central jurisdiction (as the law 
prescribes), but from the total expenditure of the whole consolidated budget of the 
system, E. Indeed, doing that, we have
 NE E NE EA EB EC ED EB EC ED EAcbc bc= - = + + + - + + =l l` j
which, as desired, retrieves the national equivalent of the expenditure responsibilities 
not held by the foral community.
10. Conclusion
This paper has shown that, if correctly calculated, the foral cupo would be noth-
ing more than an indirect form of measuring the equalising transfer between the cen-
tral government and the corresponding autonomous jurisdiction. The cupo form per 
se is completely neutral: the foral jurisdictions would operate exactly under the same 
financial conditions as the non-foral jurisdictions, despite that in the latter case the 
transfer is directly measured as the difference between regional expenditure needs 
and fiscal capacity. In the context of our model, holding constant the expenditure re-
sponsibilities of the foral and non-foral jurisdictions, and for the same tax effort, the 
reason why the two foral communities obtain more resources is the particular way in 
which this indirect form is measured: in other words, the cause of the foral economic 
advantage is the particular imputation procedure established by the law, which clearly 
biases the scales in favour of the foral and, therefore, against the non-foral commu-
nities. An economic advantage of the foral respect to the aggregate of the non-foral 
communities that, even if only referred to the design of the cupo, we have estimated 
at 29.8% in the case of the Basque Country and at 28.2% in the case on Navarre.
We feel that our approach contributes significantly to the understanding of the re-
lationship between foral, non-foral and central jurisdictions. For instance, our model 
establishes without ambiguity that the solidarity of the foral communities has nothing 
to do with the aggregate transfer to the non-foral communities being considered as 
a not assumed charge. Being formally much more explicit than previous representa-
tions of the foral system, our model is also capable of identifying with precision the 
sources of the difference between the actual cupo and a cupo measured by means of 
an imputation procedure that gives no economic advantage to the foral communities. 
In particular, we have found that the measurement of the imputed deficit is by far the 
most important source of the economic advantage granted to the two foral communi-
ties, the other two possible sources (not assumed charges and not concerted revenue) 
counteracting to some extent this gain.
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Analytical power always comes at the cost of strong assumptions. We feel that 
the ones we have put forward to specify our model are the minimum ones needed 
to retain the essential elements of the Spanish regional system, and in particular, 
of the foral system, while at the same time allowing a sufficiently simple repre-
sentation to facilitate the understanding and measurement of the substantive issues 
under investigation. We acknowledge that this simplification has left out aspects 
of the actual foral system, like the VAT adjustment or the official calculation of 
assumed and not assumed charges, which are, or may be, also sources of foral 
advantage. And for this reason we point out that the measures of foral advantage 
here obtained should be seen as minimum estimates. Also, we recognize that the 
empirical calibration of the model, which is based on the logical implications of 
official data, including those data given by the cupo laws, may have introduced an 
upward bias in our measure of the extra expenditure responsibilities of the Basque 
Country and Navarre. But on the other hand we would like to emphasize that the 
figures we come out with lead to a consistent empirical model which is manage-
able, has the global dimension of the real system and displays all the essential 
features of the actual Spanish composite formed by the foral/non-foral jurisdic-
tions. We cannot discard that some of the official data used are, as some authors 
sustain, subject to errors of measurement. But our point here is that, even taking 
these data at face value, there are compelling reasons to believe that the design 
of the actual cupo, and in particular of the imputation procedure prescribed by the 
law, is the source of a significant level of economic advantage of the foral over the 
non-foral system.
We would further like to remark the relative easiness with which our model can 
be put to work in order to gain understanding and generate insights about an issue so 
complex as the foral cupo and its incidence into the finance of the rest of the Spanish 
regional system. We are convinced that this type of analysis opens promising venues 
of productive research, particularly if in the future it is complemented with more 
detailed and consistent data regarding the foral system.
Our exercise has clear implications for reform. The Spanish Constitution, at the 
same time that «protects and respects» the foral system, requires that no Autonomous 
Community (including the two foral communities) should enjoy economic advan-
tages on account of their financing arrangements. These two provisions can only be 
accommodated, on the one hand, by accepting the much larger degree of tax capac-
ity that foral communities presently enjoy, but, on the other, by redefining the actual 
cupo so that it gives the foral community the same amount of normative resources per 
unit of need as that of non-foral communities. From a technical perspective, as the 
present article shows, this is perfectly possible. Also, it is relevant to point out that the 
laws that establish the overall financial relationship between the central government 
and the foral communities, and that define the cupo, are ordinary laws that can be 
changed by other ordinary laws after, of course, the mandatory negotiations between 
central and foral governments.
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